US Request for a British Carrier in May 1942

If you have been reading about the Battle of Midway, you have probably found a small mention about the request made by US Navy towards Royal Navy to provide assistance of one British carrier. However, there are some myths about this request, most usual of them is an opinion that US Navy wanted British carrier to join its own carriers in the Battle of Midway. So, let´s take a look on this...

By May 1942, US cryptoanalyst team led by Captain Joseph Rochefort used their partial knowledge of Japanese JN-25b code to obtain the information about new major operation of the enemy. Therefore, Admiral Nimitz had very good picture about Japanese intentions and their plan to attack the atoll of Midway early in June.

Captain Joseph Rochefort, his team provided Admiral Nimitz crucial information about Japanese intentions in Midway operation

Of course, upcoming enemy attack on Midway-Hawaii defence line was a major threat and Nimitz had to respond with greatest priority. Admiral Nimitz had only two aircraft carriers at hand in Pearl Harbor - USS Enterprise and USS Hornet. Other two carriers - USS Lexington and USS Yorktown were involved in operation in Coral Sea. Lexington was sunk there and Yorktown was badly damaged. Despite its damage, Yorktown was able to return to Pearl Harbor just in time to join upcoming Battle of Midway, mainly thanks to great effort of Pearl Harbor dock workers who were able to get the ship to be fit for battle in just three days (initial estimates of Yorktown´s damage talked about 72 days necessary for repairs). Nevertheless, with all US Navy carriers being deployed in Central Pacific, there was no carrier left for South/Southwest Pacific operational area. Therefore, on 18 May, US Navy cabled Harold Stark in Britain to give British Admiralty following message (taken from "C. a. Nimitz - Command Summary NWC DS 001 01", sometimes referred as "Nimitz Graybook, Vol.1")):

COMINCH TO SPENAVO LONDON INFO COMSOWESPACFOR CINCPAC Refer to this as Cominch 181255 action Spenavo London info Comsowespacfor CinCPac xx· Request you say to first Sea Lord in person that indicated imminence of enemy attacks on Midway and Alaska perhaps Hawaii has required withdrawal of carrier-cruiser groups from South Pacific para Comsowespacfor has cruisers and destroyers but no carrier wherewith to work against enemy activities in Coral Sea para will Admiralty entertain request for carrier from Eastern Fleet to join up with Leary temporarily, if so move had best be made at once para as alternative suggest consideration of coordinated eastern fleet and British shore based air raids on Rangoon or Andaman Islands and line of communication between Rangoon and Singapore.

As you can see, it was not US intention to have additional carrier at Midway but wanted the ship to patrol in South/Southwest Pacific just for the case. After all, even if British would agree, it was nearly impossible for British task force to make it to the Central Pacific in time to join the Midway operation. Top of that, joint operation of task forces of different navies needs a lot of preparations which were completely unrealistic to do before any Japanese action expected in the first week of June. But what was the British response? Here it is (it was sent on 19 May and it was taken again taken from Nimitz´ Command Summary mentioned above):

COMNAVEU TO COMINCH Part 1 of 2 partsxx Following is Admiralty's ·reply to your 181255 "(A) We have seen enough of Japanese tactics to realise that it is their policy to operate several carriers in company, and henc.e to send one of the 3 carriers of the Eastern Fleet to the Southwest Pacific Area would only result in our forces being weak both in the Indian Ocean and the Southwest Pacific Areas.x We do not, therefore, consider that it would be justifiable to make such a detachment ( B  ) We realize the necessity for the movements of the British Forces in the Indian Ocean and the US Forces in the Pacific being coordinated, and we appreciate the action taken by the US Fleet in April in an endeavor to relieve the Japanese pressure on the Indian Ocean x (C) Whilst there is doubt that the Japanese would welcome an attempt by our surface forces to break through the MALAYA DARWIN line so as to bring our forces within reach of their shore based air forces, we cannot believe that they would credit us with being so foolish as to do so (D) Hence, we do not consider that the knowledge that our surface forces were approaching the MALAYA DARWIN line would have any effect on the movements of Japanese naval forces x neither would an air attack on the ANDAMANS or ports in JAVA or SUMATRA xx Part 2 follows with para (E). COMNAVEU TO ·COMINCH Part 2 of 192246 x (E) Interference with the SINGAPORE-RANGOON line of communications as not considered prac- tical at the present stage as to be effective it would necessitate our surface forces being maintained within striking distance of Japanese shore based aircraft for a considerable time .. x At the moment the Eastern Fleet is at KILINKINI with. 2 of the carriers making good defects after the MADAGASCAR operations, and in a few days we are being forced to practically demobilise the Eastern Fleet by sending two thirds of its destroyers to the MEDITERRANEAN to assist in getting a convoy on which the security of MALTA depends through to that place x · (continued on next page) 498 J 19 2246 20 0151 COMNAVEU TO COMINCH (Continued) (G) CinC East Fleet is being asked whether he will have sufficient screening destroyers to proceed with part of his fleet to COLOMBO where its arrival might become known to the Japanese x If you consider such a movement would serve any useful purpose it will, if practicable, be made at the earliest possible moment.x (H) Our intelligence points to a concentration of the Japanese fleet in the TRUK area in the latter part of June, but gives no indication of an attack on either ALASKA, MIDWAY or HAWAII x Obviously however you would not have redisposed your forces without good reason, and it would be helpful if we could know on what you base your appreciation.

We can see that British Admiralty refused US request. Sometimes, it is interpreted as a lack of good will on British side. However, I believe that Brits have very good reasons to do so and the refusal was the right decision. Some of those reasons were in the response above. At first, we have to realise that Brits did not have any information about Japanese intentions in the Pacific as Americans did not share (logically) their intercepted messages. Secondly, in May 1942, British had three carriers in the Indian Ocean - HMS Indomitable, HMS Illustrious and HMS Formidable but two of them were under repairs (even though minor). More importantly - they were forced to send a pack of destroyers to the Med and therefore, they were practically unable to provide independent carrier task force operating in South Pacific.

HMS Formidable in August 1942, photograph A11660 from the collection of the Imperial War Museum

There is one other thing - British carriers of 1942 were not of the same kind as US carriers, they have less planes and had weaker defences (not only in terms of weapons but also in terms of endurance and ability to withstand a hit). For example, HMS Formidable in 1942 had only 12 F4F fighters (compare with 27 F4Fs on USS Enterprise). Operation of single British carrier was simply too risky. In case of a contact with enemy (even one Japanese light carrier) could ended tragically. And last but not least, British main interests were in Indian Ocean. Based on this, British decision in completely understandable and can be hardly interpreted as a lack of good will or even "betrayal".